Robert Rupert
- Professor
- Chair
MUEN D110
Office hours: 9:30-10:30 and by appointment via Zoom
overview
Robert Rupert (Ph.D., U. of Illinois at Chicago, 1996) works in the philosophy of mind, the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, and in related areas of philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. His research focuses particularly on mental representation, concept acquisition, mental causation, cognitive architecture, situated cognition, group cognition, natural laws, and properties. Rob has been awarded a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for College Teachers as well as an NEH summer research stipend. He has won a CU Provost's Faculty Achievement Award and a Kayden Book award, is a fellow of the Institute of Cognitive Science at CU-Boulder, and is a member of CU-Boulder's Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science. He has held visiting research positions at the University of Edinburgh, the Australian National University, and the Ruhr-Universität, Bochum. He is Co-Editor-in-Chief of the .
For more information, see Professor Rupert's CV.
selected papers
- “Self-knowledge in a Human Mind Flattened from Above,” forthcoming in a volume edited by C. Wright, G. Melis, and G. Merlo, Oxford University Press
- “Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self,” themed issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2022): 947–972
- “Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale,” co-authored with J. Adam Carter, Synthese 198: 9243–9272, (2021)
- “The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self from the Personal Level,”&Բ;Philosophic Exchange 47 (2018), 1–36:
- “Representation and Mental Representation,”&Բ;Philosophical Explorations 21, 2 (2018), 204–225, special issue on enactivism, representationalism, and predictive processing
- “Acting Up: What Difference Does an Action-Oriented Approach Make to the Study of Cognitive Development?” co-authored with Giovanni Pezzulo, Gottfried Vosgerau, Uta Frith, Antonia Hamilton, Cecilia Heyes, Atsushi Iriki, Henrik Jörntell, Peter König, Saskia Nagel, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, and Antonella Tramacere. In A. Engel, K. Friston, and D. Kragic (eds.) The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), pp. 53–81
- “Triple Review of J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science; Anthony Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science; and Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind,”&Բ;Mind 125 (Jan., 2016), 497: 209–228
- “”,&Բ;American Philosophical Quarterly 53, 2 (April, 2016): 169–192
- “”, Mind 125 (Jan., 2016), 497: 209–228
- “”,&Բ;û 48, 3 (2014): 558–564
- “” In S. Chant, F. Hindriks, and G. Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 97–111
- “”, Philosophical Studies 152 (2011): 427–436
- "”, Philosophical Topics 39, 1 (2011): 99–120
- "," in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 96-116.
- “,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, 3 (November 2008): 579-612.
- “,” û 42 (2008): 349-80.
- “,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2007): 1-11.
- “,” û 40 (2006): 256-83.
- “,” Journal of Philosophy 101 (2004): 389-428.
- “,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 499-530.
- “,” Mind & Language 14 (1999): 321-55
- “,” Synthese 117 (1998-99): 95-131.