蜜桃传媒破解版下载

Politicians may talk tough about rival nations, but business people鈥檚 actions may be a better barometer of international relations.

That鈥檚 one conclusion of Steve Chan, a political science professor at the University of Colorado who says conventional political theories don鈥檛 explain why China has become Taiwan鈥檚 most important trading partner, edging out both the United States and Japan.

In 2005, China accounted for 40 percent of Taiwan鈥檚 exports and 70 percent of its foreign direct investment, according to PBS鈥檚 Nightly Business Report. Official sources give lower estimates of trade, but even those numbers are significant:

Mainland China reported that trade between China and Taiwan reached $108 billion in U.S. dollars in 2006, an 18-percent jump from 2005. These trends are continuing, Chan says, and they show that Taiwan鈥檚 commercial ties with China are 鈥渂oth highly salient and asymmetrically important to its economy.鈥�

What the numbers don鈥檛 explain, however, is why this burst of commerce is occurring between these longtime rivals. Mainland China claims Taiwan as its own territory, but Taiwan has been living as a de facto separate state for five decades.

What鈥檚 more, the government of Taiwan has been officially opposed to expanded trade with China. Taiwan鈥檚 Democratic Progressive Party, which held power until March 2008, espoused official Taiwanese independence and discouraged trade with China.

Last year, Taiwan voters replaced the DPP with the Kuomintang鈥攁lso called the KMT or Nationalist Party鈥攚hich also has historically discouraged trade with China.

Given this political landscape and that history, Chan notes, the rapid rise in cross-Strait trade is 鈥渂affling.鈥�

In the September issue of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, a scholarly journal, Chan argues that the political theories of realism and liberalism cannot easily account for this phenomenon.

Realism, a political theory that contends that states protect their interests by pursuing a balance of power with rivals, would not have predicted thriving commerce between Taiwan and China, Chan notes. That鈥檚 because Taiwan lacks China鈥檚 power, and trading with China could leave Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

The theory of liberalism fares no better, Chan suggests. Classical liberalism emphasizes the role of property rights and contract enforcement, systems that ensure that the free market won鈥檛 become hostage to government fiat. Such systems don鈥檛 buttress cross-Strait trade.

So why is Taiwan trading so much with China when the same cannot be said of other longtime rivals鈥攊ncluding North and South Korea, Syria and Israel, Cuba and the United States?

A key difference, Chan argues, is that business leaders have a good sense of the safety of their investments abroad. Further, they can distinguish between politicians鈥� 鈥渃heap talk鈥� and their governments鈥� real commitments.

鈥淭he actions of the business community are more credible because unlike government officials, entrepreneurs are unlikely to sacrifice profit for the sake of political posturing or 鈥榗heap talk,鈥欌�� Chan writes.

A Taiwanese president may 鈥渟peak to the gallery鈥� about his intention to pursue formal independence from China, thereby jeopardizing trade. But business people will know whether that tough talk is accompanied by equally restrictive action.

Chan asks, 鈥淲hat would a president who is seriously determined for independence do?鈥� He would not overlook cross-Strait commerce, Chan contends.

In that sense, the nation鈥檚 public messages differ from information known to private institutions. Stock markets pay close attention to political events, Chan notes. As health-care reform is debated on Capitol Hill, insurance companies鈥� stocks are probably re-assessed hourly.

In June 2007, Taiwan鈥檚 DPP government announced its intention to conduct a referendum on whether Taiwan should apply for U.N. membership under the name 鈥淭aiwan鈥� rather than 鈥淩epublic of China,鈥� Chan observes.

The referendum was defeated along with the DPP in March 2008. If Taiwan鈥檚 business community had been seriously worried about the referendum鈥檚 passage (and Chinese reprisals) the stock market should have reflected this concern.

It didn鈥檛.

Chan compares the price of the Taiwan Greater China Fund with Fidelity鈥檚 Spartan 500 index fund between June and October of 2007. The Taiwan Greater China Fund did not fall with the news of the referendum. Instead, it rose until mid-July, when concerns about the U.S. financial sector prompted a sell-off.

Meanwhile, the Taiwan Greater China Fund tracked closely with the Fidelity fund. If investors were worried about rising cross-Strait tension, this would have been a time to show it. Chan sees this as evidence that the stock market found the politicians鈥� rhetoric to be phony.

鈥淭hese are objective indicators, because they are not partisan.鈥�

The extent of cross-Strait trade is more than a reliable indicator of the state of Taiwan-China relations he adds; the rising level of commerce is also encouraging.

鈥淧eacefully inclined people get into trading relations in the first place,鈥� Chan says. 鈥淭his is where the rubber meets the road.鈥�

But the fact that cross-Strait trade is a positive sign does not imply that the international community should necessarily encourage trade between rivals, which in other cases might not be peacefully inclined.